The problem with the Ghandi analogy was that he used the inherent decency of the British people against them in order to free India. He, effectively, said that unless we were willing to change ourselves into the kind of people that would virtually depopulate the country and rule by absolute terror, then we would never control the Indian people. The British people felt unanimously, that we weren't that sort of a nation. The whole of British Imperialism has always been based on the idea that both Colony and Imperial state profit from the relationship - we get raw materials and wealth, they get stable governance, military protection from less altruistic masters (France or Spain for example), the rule of Law (most subjects of a Crown Colony experienced MORE freedoms under Imperial Governance than they did as "free citizens" under a local warlord) and increased opportunities for trade and education. Ghandi himself was educated in a British university.
Balanced against this relatively benign occupation we have the American model - which is to go in quickly, smash the existing power structure with maximum force and put in a local government that is friendly towards free trade. After this point, market forces are supposed to be sufficient to rebuild the infrastructure and kickstart a modern economy. This is a fine idea in principle, with only one minor drawback.
It's completely ineffective.
It didn't work in Vietnam. It didn't work in Afghanistan. It's not working in Iraq.
What WOULD work would be a transparent program of infrastructure investment and construction, based around small scale projects in which obvious progress could be seen. Forget modernisation, lets settle for sewage and drinking water. Let's settle for healthcare and food. That's what the people of Iraq need - along with the purging of foreign elements that are seeking to destabilise the peace. And there will be a price - in money and blood.
We should have made it clear that until the country was operating again, that not a penny of oil would be sold. That Iraq was out of business until it was rebuilt. Only THEN would the Iraqi people have believed we went in for anything other than control of those oilfields.
Once in position, the troops you deploy must become PART of the local scene. they shouldn't wear helmets or be heavily armed. Strong reaction squads should be in reserve, ready to be deployed where necessary, but patrols should NOT be in force. They should also be on FOOT within townships and cities. Flak jackets and sunglasses should NOT be worn. You have to make these troops into human beings for the local people - give gum to kids and respect local customs.
This kind of approach WORKS. It worked in Malay, it worked in Kenya, it worked in Dhofari Oman. It worked in Northern Ireland.
Given the fact that the UK is one of the ONLY armies to have defeated locally supported communist insurgents you'd think the US would be tripping over itself to get help and advice from us. Guess who the US has directing their policy towards the Iraqi people? Israel.
I think that says everything that needs to be said...
Eon
