Freewill

Go for it.

If you think that God's existence is logically necessary, then by all means, bring possible world semantics to the table.

How do you propose to dispel the various paradoxes that arise from possible world semantics?
 
Could someone explain what possible world semantics is? I can't argue what I don't know.
 
Oh this is indeed murky waters, but it deserves to be looked at at least once in any Free Will/Omniscience incompatibilty argument. I'll try to make this as breif and as accurate as I can. This is _not_ an argument for free will, it simply refutes that Omniscience and Free Will are incompatible.

Possible World Semantics, you might know it as alternate existances or whatnot. It propses that there are "alternate worlds" where things are slightly different than what our "actual world" is. For example, there could be a World where the english language developed in such a way that their "up" is our "down" and vice versa. For any possible thing that you can think of, there is a world where that is true.

What I mean by possible is there are no self-contradictory things in other "possible worlds". There are no married bachelors, and 2+2=4, in the sense that if you have 2 nectarines, and you recieve 2 more, you don't suddenly have 5 nectarines, as Arabic number could have developed differently on another possible world.

I'm going to use the word "necessary" heavily in the next argument here. The definition of "necessary" goes as follows:

If something is necessary, it is true in all possible worlds.
If something is possible, it is true in at least one possible world.
If something is impossible, it is not true in any world.

Thus the following statements are correct:
It is necessary that there are no married bachelors.
It is possible that my hair is green.
It is impossible that there are married bachelors.

Nelson Pike's argument (which is the most common base for the arguement against free will) goes as follows (short & sweet version):

(1)If God knows in advance that Jones will mow his lawn, then it must be the case that Jones will mow his lawn.
(2)If it must be the case that Jones will mow his law, then Jones cannot refrain from mowing his lawn.
(3)If Jones does not mow his lawn, then God promptly disappears in a puff of logic.

However, Alvin Plantinga points out that (2) relies on (1). And 1 is inherently false via Possible World Semantics.

(1a) Necessarily, if God knows in advance that Jones will mow his lawn, then Jones will mow his lawn.
(1b)If God knows in advance that Jones will mow his lawn, then it is necessary that Jones will mow his lawn.

Let me rewrite it using the definition of necessary.
(1a) If it is true in all possible worlds that God knows in advance that Jones will mow his lawn, then Jones will mow his lawn.
(1b) If God knows in advance that Jones will mow his lawn, then it is true in all possible worlds that Jones will mow his lawn.

The truth of (1) requires that (1b) is true. However proposition (1b) is false. (1a) is just fine.

It just simply doesn't follow that if God knows P, then P is true in all possible worlds.



If you didn't understand any of this, that is OK. Forget about it. This is hairy stuff.
 
The problem with Plantinga, from a Christian standpoint, is that he asserts that God is unable, rather than prefers, to create a world where free-willed creatures might possibly do wrong. That, obviously, goes against the omnimax view of God.

Pike, as well as Plantinga, both agree that a good being will eliminate evil whenever necessary, but SOMETIMES evil is necessary. Therefore a good being allows some evil to exist. That poses more problems for Christians, because it asserts that Christian ideals are inconsistent, which Christians deny.

Using first order modal logic we can show one of the biggest problems with this theory. If it is possible for God to exist in a world, then God exists in every possible world. Logic can conclude that, but the same old problem arises. The need is still there to show evidence of God in any one of these possible worlds.

Possible world semantics is a bunch of HOOEY!
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[b said:
Quote[/b] ] The need is still there to show evidence of God in any one of these possible worlds.
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It is my understanding that by the premise that it is possible that there is a maximally great being we have shown that he exists in at least one possible world, and thusly in all worlds.
 
Who needs proof? All you have to do is agree that it is possible. You and I have no knowledge of these other worlds, but indeed I can concieve that it is possible that there exists a being than which no greater can be concieved. Sounds like you're a philosophy major. x.X
 
Actually I majored in Architectural Design, I only minored in philosophy
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Look, if you're going to push possible world semantics then please explain these paradoxes:

Russell
[b said:
Quote[/b] ]If m be a class of propositions, the proposition ``every m is true'' may or may not be itself an m. But there is a one-one relation of this proposition to m: if n be different from m, ``every n is true'' is not the same proposition as ``every m is true''. Consider now the whole class of propositions of the form ``every m is true'', and having the property of not being members of their respective m's. Let this class be w, and let p be the proposition ``every w is true''. If p is a w, it must possess the defining property of w; but this property demands that p should not be a w. On the other hand, if p be not a w, then p does possess the defining property of w, and therefore is a w. Thus the contradiction appears unavoidable.
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Davies
[b said:
Quote[/b] ]Suppose that the cardinality of the set of fully determinate counterfactual states of affairs (possible worlds) is K. Each subset of this set determines (or, on some accounts, is) a proposition, namely the proposition which would be expressed by a sentence which was true with respect to precisely the possible worlds in that subset. There are thus 2K such propositions, and 2K is strictly greater than K (by Cantor's theorem). Consider some man X and time t. For each proposition it is possible that X should have been thinking a thought at t whose content would be specifiable by a sentence expressing that proposition. So there is a distinct possible situation corresponding to each such proposition, and so there are at least 2 K possible worlds. But we began by assuming that there are precisely K possible worlds. (I am indebted here to David Kaplan and Christopher Peacocke). There are, of course, things which can be said in response to this apparent paradox. But it does raise a doubt about the coherence of the notion of a fully determinate counterfactual state of affairs."
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Lewis
[b said:
Quote[/b] ]1. Suppose that the cardinality of the set of possible worlds is K.
2. Each subset of this set is a proposition, namely the proposition which would be expressed by a sentence which was true with respect to precisely the worlds in that subset.
3. There are 2K such propositions, and 2K is strictly greater than K.
4. Consider some man and time. For each proposition, it is possible that he should have been thinking a thought at that time whose content would be specifiable by a sentence expressing that proposition; and that this should have been his only thought at that time.
5. So there is a distinct possible situation corresponding to each such proposition.
6. So there are at least 2K possible worlds, contradicting the assumption with which we began.
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There are many, many more if you'd like to take a shot at those too.

The problem with possible world semantics are the paradoxes. They're unavoidable.
 
LOL, you're the one that brought this stuff up, not me.

It's a bit difficult to "dumb down" a paradox. It IS a paradox after all.
 
AH, I just thought about this.

Riddle me this Batman, Can God create a rock so heavy that He can't lift?

Voila, paradox in the making.

You are assuming that God, an omnimax being, must reside within the limits of logic. If we say, yes, He does, then He isn't omnimax. If we say, no, He resides outside of logic, then there is no point to possible world semantics as an ontological argument.

Here's another one for you...are square circles, square? Analytically they are, but it is still logically impossible.
 
Omnipotence doesn't mean he can do anything persay, it means that he can do anything that is possible. Creating a rock so heavy that he cannot lift is self contradictory, as is creating a square circle. Just like the married bachelor argument in my presentation on possible worlds.

Well he has to be within the bounds of logic, otherwise even discussing his mere nature is neigh impossible. Win win situation for me. If he trans-logical (he extends beyond the bounds of logic), then this discussion is null and void, if he is logical, well then you can't bring illogical things like square circles into the discussion to prove God's lack of omnipotence.
 
So which position are you taking?

Are you arguing FOR the existence of God, against the existence of God, or are you here just to argue?

You said God HAS to be within the bounds of logic, yet your reason for Him being so is what? Because discussing Him would be impossible? That's not a very good reason. Worse than that, it's not LOGICAL, which is an affront to your use of logic.

If God is bound by the rules of logic, then your possible world semantics goes out the window. How is that a win-win situation?

If He is bound by ANYTHING, wouldn't that nullify his omnimax status? God isn't bound by time or space, so why logic?

Example, before there was anything, God existed. That alone is proof (according to the Bible) that God exists outside of logic.
 
[b said:
Quote[/b] (Dark Virtue @ Oct. 08 2004,10:01)]
[b said:
Quote[/b] (BBBK @ Oct. 08 2004,9:29)]Some things just have to be taken on faith.
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What DOESN'T have to be taken on Faith?
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Well for me God's existence is no longer a matter of faith. I've felt His presence. I know He exists.

What I meant by that statement you quoted though is that there are millions of questions not answered in scripture but I have faith that God has everything sorted out. ie Does it really matter if I know exactly how the universe was formed? No. All that matters is that I have faith that He created it.
 
Sorry BBBK, but God's existence is STILL a matter of faith for you. You have no PROOF, you have no EVIDENCE. And if you do, then you would be the first person in the history of mankind and I suggest you share it.

EVERYTHING you believe must be taken on Faith.
 
[b said:
Quote[/b] (BBBK @ Oct. 15 2004,7:59)]
[b said:
Quote[/b] (Dark Virtue @ Oct. 08 2004,10:01)]
[b said:
Quote[/b] (BBBK @ Oct. 08 2004,9:29)]Some things just have to be taken on faith.
Click to expand...
What DOESN'T have to be taken on Faith?
Click to expand...
Well for me God's existence is no longer a matter of faith. I've felt His presence. I know He exists.

What I meant by that statement you quoted though is that there are millions of questions not answered in scripture but I have faith that God has everything sorted out. ie Does it really matter if I know exactly how the universe was formed? No. All that matters is that I have faith that He created it.
Click to expand...
It's impossible to 'know' that there is a god. That's why there is a thing called 'faith.'
 
Hmmm, I don't think I'd say IMPOSSIBLE.

I think it may be more specific to say that up to this point in time, we have had no evidence, proof or reason to support a belief in a god.
 
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